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NOTES
NOTES
PRIORITIES IN MISSOURI BANK LIQUIDATIONS*
Victims of the unprecedented flood of bank failures of the last
decade and a half are only too well aware of its incidents. Even
the cold statistics of the Federal Reserve Board, which tell but
a part of the story, are appalling. From 1921 to the date of the
declaration of the national bank holiday in 1933,' 11,236 of the
total of thirty thousand state and national banks failed, almost
half of the number during the first three years of the depression.
Small wonder that in those three years the aggregate of bank
deposits of the country decreased more than twenty-five per-
cent.2
With each failure was hatched a brood of suits by claimants
against the disabled bank. Desperate depositors sought prefer-
ences on ingenious theories; liquidating officers sought to pro-
tect general creditors and to effect an equitable distribution of
the remaining assets. Missouri courts have achieved national
recognition for their liberal doctrines favoring claimants for
priority of payment.3 Perhaps because of this advanced position
claims for such preferences have been and are an especially fruit-
ful source of litigation in Missouri. This note is an attempt to
categorize to some extent the grounds of granting preferences
recognized by the Missouri courts.
I. PROCEDURE ON INSOLVENCY
The questions involved in this note presuppose the insolvency
of the bank. The state commissioner of finance, whose office is
created and whose powers are defined by statute,4 may in his
discretion close a bank and take charge of all its property on
discovery by examination that the bank is insolvent or that its
continuance would jeopardize the safety of bank indebtedness.5
Moreover any bank, by posting a notice to that effect, may at
any time place its affairs under the commissioner's control.6
Banks are expressly prohibited from making voluntary general
assignments for benefit of creditors. All transfers of assets made
* The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Professor Charles
E. Cullen of the School of Law, Washington University, for special assis-
tance and cooperation in the preparation of this survey.
1. (1933) Executive Order No. 2039, 12 U. S. C. A. sec. 95, note.
2. Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions (1936) iii.
3. Id. at secs. 712, 858. See also Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 247.
4. R. S. Mo. (1929) ch. 34.
3. Id. at secs. '712, 858. See also Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 247.
6. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5316 (3).
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after committing any act of insolvency, or in contemplation there-
of, with a view to preference of creditors are utterly null and
void.7 In the commissioner's hands the bank's assets are held in
trust for the benefit of all creditors alike; and the claims of all
depositors become due without demand and placed on the same
basis of payment.8 However the requirement of equal distribu-
tion of assets to creditors does not preclude allowance of statu-
tory priorities nor equitable preferences, granted on the theory
that the beneficiary is given back his own property, the title to
which he never lost to the bank., While Missouri cases declare
that the directors of an insolvent bank hold the assets in trust
for its creditors, 0 they do not necessarily hold for the benefit of
all creditors alike, as will later appear. Mere insolvency of the
bank does not prevent a preference which is created by opera-
tion of law.:"
Claimants of the same class must be treated alike. 12 Preferred
claims cannot be paid before the time for filing of all such claims
has expired, the value of the assets been ascertained, and the
time for distribution arrived. 3 All preferred claims must be
prorated, whether statutory or otherwise; priority rights exist
against general creditors, not against other preferred claimants. 14
To be entitled to a preferential payment from the assets of an
insolvent bank in the hands of the bank commissioner, the claim-
ant must show that the bank held the funds in question as his
agent, trustee, or bailee, and not as debtor; that the funds aug-
7. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 5318. On the same general principles a bank
may not make secret pledges of its assets to secure deposits. Braver,
Liquidation of Financial Institutions (1936) sec. 75. An exception however
is recognized where there is a statutory requirement of security before a
deposit can be made, as in deposits of public funds. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
11469. French v. School Dist. (1928) 223 Mo. App. 53, 7 S. W. (2d) 415;
Consolidated School Dist. v. Citizens' Saving Bank (1929) 223 Mo. App.
940, 21 S. W. (2d) 781.
8. Farmers' Bank of Deepwater v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W.
(2d) 906, 909; Kling v. Benson Banking Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 100 S. W.
(2d) 639.
9. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5339; Polk Tp., ex rel. Seaton v. Harrison (Mo.
App. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d) 738. In re Mt. Vernon Bank (1933) 334 Mo.
549, 66 S. W. (2d) 850; Security National Bank Savings & Trust Co. v.
Moberly (Mo. 1936) 101 S. W. (2d) 33.
10. Roan v. Winn (1887) 93 Mo. 503, 509, 4 S. W. 736.
11. Kahmann v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 858; Barnett
Grocer Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust and Savings Co. (Mo. App. 1935)
78 S. W. (2d) 875.
12. Farmers' Bank of Deepwater v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W.
(2d) 906.
13. Methodist Benev. Ass'n v. Bank of Sweet Springs (1932) 227 Mo.
App. 566, 54 S. W. (2d) 474.
14. In re Mt. Vernon Bank (1933) 333 Mo. 549, 66 S. W. (2d) 850.
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mented the assets of the bank; and that as such they came into
the finance commissioner's hands.15 It is difficult, however, to
lay down hard and fast rules to guide in the determination of
preferences. Each preference must be allowed on the special
facts of its case.16 The bank commissioner has no power to deter-
mine priorities but must refer that question to the circuit court.17
The allowance of preferences is an equitable proceeding, in fact,
though not in form, between the claimant and the creditors of
the bank for an equitable separation of the claimant's property
from the debtor bank's property. 8 Due regard is given through-
out to the maxims and principles of equity. 9
II. KINDS OF DEPOSITS
A. General Deposits
A deposit of money in a bank in the ordinary course of busi-
ness is presumed to be general, absent a special agreement to
contrary effect. In the case of such a deposit, title passes to the
bank, which becomes a debtor to the depositor. The bank is en-
titled to the use of the money and is required to pay not the
identical money but the equivalent, on the demand of the deposi-
tor.2  Upon insolvency of the bank such a depositor is not en-
titled to any preference but must share with the general credi-
tors in the equal and ratable distribution of the assets by the
bank commissioner." The assets include funds realized from the
15. Kline v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 526; Porterfield v.
Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936, 82 A. L. R.
22; Security Nat. Bank Savings & Trust Co. v. Moberly (Mo. 1936) 101
S. W. (2d) 33.
16. City of Portageville v. Harrison (1933) 228 Mo. App. 27, 63 S. W.
(2d) 410.
17. R. S. Mo. (1929) sees. 5336, 5339; Methodist Benev. Ass'n v. Bank
of Sweet Springs (1932) 227 Mo. App. 560, 54 S. W. (2d) 474; In re Mt.
Vernon Bank (1933) 334 Mo. 549, 66 S. W. (2d) 850. See Const. of Mo.,
art. VI, sec. 22.
18. Bircher v. Walther (1901) 163 Mo. 461, 63 S. W. 691; In re Mt.
Vernon Bank (1933) 334 Mo. 549, 66 S. W. (2d) 850.
19. Wauer v. Bank of Pendleton (1933) 228 Mo. App. 1150, 65 S. W.(2d) 167; Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App. 525, 71 S. W.(2d) 121; Smalley v. Queen City Bank (Mo. App. 1936) 94 S. W. (2d) 954.
20. First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank (1903) 102 Mo. App. 357, 76
S. W. 489; State ex rel. American Central Ins. Co. v. Gehner (1928) 320
Mo. 901, 9 S. W. (2d) 621, 59 A. L. R. 1041; Butcher v. Butler (1908)
134 Mo. App. 61, 114 S. W. 564; Craig v. Bank of Granby (1922) 210
Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507; Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App.
990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655; In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931)
39 S. W. (2d) 412; In re Cooper County State Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 67
S. W. (2d) 109; McClure Garage v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 76
S. W. (2d) 438.
21. "No rule of equity appeals more to the judicial conscience than that
which requires the assets of an insolvent corporation to be distributed
ratably among creditors, and he who claims a departure from this must
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liability of officers and directors to the bank for losses caused
by negligence or mismanagement, and likewise from their obli-
gations undertaken to preserve the solvency of the bank.22
B. Special Deposits
Many Missouri cases quote the following language in distin-
guishing between general and special deposits:
A general deposit is where the bank is given custody of
the money with the intention express or implied that the
bank is not to be required to return the identical money,
but only its equivalent. In such cases the legal title to the
money at once passes to the bank, and the depositor divested
of his title must rely merely on the obligation of the bank
to repay him.
In the case of a special deposit the bank merely assumes
charge and custody of property without authority to use it,
and the depositor is entitled to receive back the identical
thing deposited. The title remains with the depositor, and,
if the subject be money, the bank has no right to mingle it
with other funds.
23
The fact that the bank does commingle a special deposit with its
establish his right clearly." McClure Garage v. Sturdivant Bank, supra.
See also Union National Bank v. Lyons (1909) 220 Mo. 538, 119 S. W.
540; Missouri Mutual Ass'n v. Holland Banking Co. (1927) 220 Mo. App.
1256, 290 S. W. 100; Oliver v. Commercial Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 48 S. W.
(2d) 99; Fred A. Boswell Post v. Farmers' State Bank (Mo. 1933) 61
S. W. (2d) 761; Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cantley (1933) 228
Mo. App. 14, 62 S. W. (2d) 1931; Cockrell v. Moberly (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W.
(2d) 185.
22. Craig v. Stacy (1932) 330 Mo. 569, 50 S. W. (2d) 104, construing
R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5341, 5381-3.
23. Butcher v. Butler (1908) 134 Mo. App. 61, 1. c. 69, 114 S. W. 564;
Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville (1923) 246 S. W. 614; Ellington v. Cantley
(Mo. App. 1927) 300 S. W. 529; In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App.
1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 412; In re Central Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 68
S. W. (2d) 919; In re Home Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 69 S. W. (2d)
312; Vandivort v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 484.
The following dicta appeared in In re Home Trust Co., supra, 1. c. 316
"However the rule has been greatly relaxed so that where the money de-
posited is to be used for a specifically designated purpose, it may still be
regarded as a special deposit, even though the funds were deposited (under
an agreement allowing them to be commingled with other funds) in the
bank, and they are so mingled that the identical money deposited can no
longer be identified." This was disapproved so far as the italicized words
are concerned by the Supreme Court of Missouri in Security Nat. Bank
Savings & Trust Co. v. Moberly (Mo. 1936) 101 S. W. (2d) 33, 1. c. 38.
The court there said: "Thus, Missouri is in harmony with the greater weight
of authority as the same is represented in Restatement, Trusts, sec. 12,
comment h: 'If money is deposited in bank for a special purpose the bank
is a trustee or bailee of the money if, but only if, it is the understanding
of the parties that the money deposited is not to be used by the bank for
its own purposes.'
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general funds or places it to the credit of the depositor's general
checking account without his knowledge or consent cannot de-
feat the right of the customer to reclaim the amount out of the
bank's assets on its insolvency.24 The fact determinative of the
depositor's right to claim a special deposit is the right of the
bank to commingle and use the deposit under the bona fide
agreement between the parties as determined by their manifested
mutual intent.
2 5
The burden of proof is always on a person claiming a prefer-
ence in the assets of an insolvent bank to show that his deposit
is not general, but special.2 6 Parol evidence is admissible to show
an oral agreement between the bank and the depositor that the
deposit should be special, notwithstanding the existence of writ-
ten indicia of a general deposit.2 7 However, a deposit for a spe-
cial purpose with the bank's consent is not a special deposit with-
out a distinct understanding that the fund is to be kept separate
immediately from the time of the deposit.2 8 The fact that a de-
24. Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville, supra; Evans v. People's Bank
(1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655; In re North Missouri Trust
Co., supra; Central Coal & Coke Co. v. State Bank (1931) 226 Mo. App.
594, 44 S. W. (2d) 188; Kent v. Bolckow State Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App.
544, 70 S. W. (2d) 129; Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank (1934) 228 Mo.
App. 525, 71 S. W. (2d) 121; Vandivort v. Sturdivant Bank, supra; Cock-
rell v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 185.
25. In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d)
412; Ozark Fruit Growers' Ass'n v. Bank of Aurora (Mo. App. 1932) 52
S. W. (2d) 430; Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App. 525,
71 S. W. (2d) 121; Vandivort v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 77
S. W. (2d) 484; Security Nat. Bank Savings & Trust Co. v. Moberly
(Mo. 1936) 101 S. W. (2d) 33; Moehlenkamp v. Savings Trust Co. (Mo.
App. 1937) 108 S. W. (2d) 605.
26. First Nat. Bank v. City Nat. Bank (1903) 102 Mo. App. 357, 76
S. W. 489; Craig v. Bank of Granby (1922) 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W.
507; Kling v. Benson Banking Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 100 S. W. (2d) 638,
and cases cited; In re Citizens' Bank of Senath (Mo. App. 1937) 102 S. W.
(2d) 830, and cases cited.
27. Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse (1926) 220 Mo. App. 1019, 278 S. W.
793, where the bank's note was held executed as a result of fraud and was
considered but a memorandum open to explanation; Greenfield v. Clarence
Savings Bank (Mo. App. 1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 708, where the bank presi-
dent's note was held of no effect on claimant's right and not prejudicial
to creditors; In re Liquidation of Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App.
1934) 77 S. W. (2d) 480, where pass book, deposit slips, and signature
cards were held not to contain the full contract of the parties; McPheeters
v. Scott County Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 456, where secret
conversations were allowed to prevail over a matured certificate of deposit.
28. Butcher v. Butler (1908) 134 Mo. App. 61, 114 S. W. 564; Craig v.
Bank of Granby (1922) 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507; In re North
Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 412; Gibson v. Gower
Bank (1932) 227 Mo. App. 264, 52 S. W. (2d) 411; Fred A. Boswell
Post v. Farmers' State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 61 S. W. (2d) 762; Cockrell
v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 185; Security Nat. Bank Sav-
ings & Trust Co. v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1936) 101 S. W. (2d) 33.
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posit is not subject to check is of no significance if the bank is
allowed by the depositor to use the money for its own purposes.2 1
On the other hand the fact that the depositor checked against his
account has been held not to defeat his preferential claim, where
the bank agreed to act as trustee of a certain amount thereof
for investment purposes, and the checks never depleted the ac-
count below the amount.30 A special deposit may become general
by the subsequent conduct of the parties, such as the depositor's
knowingly permitting such a deposit to be placed in his general
checking account, or his issuing a check against the deposit. 1
The weight of authority unites with Missouri in holding that
where a bank receives a deposit in cash or its equivalent with
the clear understanding, express or implied, that it is to be
applied to a particular debt,32 invested in certain securities, 83
paid to certain parties on consummation of a condition, 4 ap-
plied to meet certain checks,35 or transmitted to a designated
29. Butcher v. Butler, supra; Missouri Mutual Ass'n v. Holland Banking
Co. (1927) 220 Mo. App. 1256, 290 S. W. 100; In re Liquidation of Fidelity
Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 77 S. W. (2d) 480. See also Greene
County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cantley (1933) 228 Mo. App. 14, 62 S. W.(2d) 931; Missouri Utilities Co. v. Scott County Bank (1933) 62 S. W. (2d)
933, where deposits were general though drawn against but once a month.
In each of these cases the bank received the deposit as a collection agent for
the claimants.
30. Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank, supra. This case held also that the
cashier's prediction that a check against the special deposit in violation of
the contract of deposit would be honored did not make the deposit general.
31. Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cantley (1933) 228 Mo. App.
14, 62 S. W. (2d) 931; Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App.
525, 71 S. W. (2d) 121.
32. Noll v. Harrison County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 923, 11 S. W.(2d) 73; Kelley v. Joplin State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 171;
Vandivort v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 484.
33. Harrison v. Smith (1884) 83 Mo. 210; Greenfield v. Clarence Sav-
ings Bank (Mo. App. 1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 708; Evans v. People's Bank(1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655; Porterfield v. Farmers'
Exchge. Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936, 82 A. L. R. 22;
In re Cooper County State Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 67 S. W. (2d) 109;
Spicer v. Round Prairie Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App. 525, 71 S. W. (2d)
121; Kent v. Bolckow State Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App. 544, 70 S. V. (2d)
129; Wauer v. Bank of Pendleton (1933) 228 Mo. App. 1150, 65 S. W.(2d) 167; Arnall v. Commercial Bank of Wellsville (Mo. App. 1932) 45
S. W. (2d) 909.
34. Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville (Mo. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 614;
Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse (1925) 220 Mo. App. 1019, 278 S. W. 793;
In re Central Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 919.
35. Craig v. Bank of Granby (1922) 210 Mo. App. 334, 238 S. W. 507(recognizing but holding rule inapplicable); Central Coal & Coke Co. v.
State Bank (1931) 226 Mo. App. 594, 44 S. W. (2d) 171; Ozark Fruit
Growers' Ass'n v. Bank of Aurora (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 430;
Kelley v. Joplin State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 171; In re
Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 77 S. W. (2d) 480; In re
Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1936) 89 S. W. (2d) 89. See Fred A. Boswell
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recipient, 33 the deposit is special and is regarded as a trust fund
in the hands of the bank. If the bank fails to fulfil its duty as
to the fund before insolvency, the depositor is entitled to a pre-
ferred claim over the claims of general creditors, provided, of
course, that the other requisites to a preference are present.327
III. DEPOSITS FOR COLLECTION
When a draft or check deposited for collection is forwarded
to a correspondent bank for collection, the correspondent bank
may pay the forwarding bank by remittance or by employment
of reciprocal accounts.38 If remittance is adopted as the method,
the proceeds are actually sent in currency or exchange to the
bank of deposit as soon as collected. The collecting bank acts
only as agent for the forwarding bank and holds the proceeds
in trust until paid or unconditionally credited. In the case of
reciprocal accounts, the collecting bank merely gives credit to
the forwarding bank, and the latter charges the account of the
collecting bank. Periodic settlements of accounts are then made.
Post v. Farmers' State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 61 S. W. (2d) 761, where
evidence was held insufficient to establish a special deposit. The cases deal-
ing with deposits to meet checks require that the bank be able to identify
the checks drawn thereon by some means of designation, recognizable on
presentment. Missouri is liberal in finding a special deposit in such cases.
Cf. the leading case expounding the contrary view, Northern Sugar Corp.
v. Thompson (C. C. A. 8, 1926) 13 F. (2d) 829. Braver expresses prefer-
ence for the Missouri view. Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions
(1936) 682, sec. 602, n. 47.
In these cases the checkholder as well as the depositor may recover the
amount of the check from the bank, the N. I. L. provision that a check
does not operate as an assignment not applying to special deposits. York
v. Farmers' Bank (1904) 105 Mo. App. 127, 79 S. W. 968; Pile v. Bank
of Flemington (1915) 187 Mo. App. 61, 173 S. W. 50.
36. Stoller v. Coates (1885) 88 Mo. 514; Fletcher v. Cantley (1932)
236 Mo. App. 1060, 47 S. W. (2d) 217; Kelley v. Joplin State Bank (Mo.
App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 171.
37. Supra, notes 32-36. See cases from other jurisdictions cited in
Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions (1936) 593, sec. 532.
A deposit of a check or draft for a special purpose, the drawer and
drawee having sufficient funds to meet it, is equivalent to a deposit of
cash, and the segregation of funds for that purpose is equivalent to aug-
mentation of the assets if the purpose is not carried out. Stoller v. Coates,
supra; Noll v. Harrison County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 923, 11 S. W.
(2d) 73; Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d)
655; Fletcher v. Cantley, supra; Kelley v. Joplin State Bank, supra. So,
giving of a past due time certificate of deposit is held sufficient. In re
Cooper County State Bank, supra. See also Blackshaw v. French (Mo.
App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 916, where the oral direction of a depositor to
transmit was held sufficient order for payment of deposit.
38. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1925) 275 S. W. 579, approved
in (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733, 47 A. L. R. 754. Intent of the parties
in forwarding items for collection and remittance is controlling in deter-
mining which method is used. Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926)
314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706.
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When the reciprocal account method is adopted, the transaction
has been held to change the agency relation to one of debtor-
creditor.89 The court points out that there is no augmentation
of assets by transferring of liability from a depositor to the cor-
respondent; consequently there is no trust res to which a trust
may attach. 0 Missouri courts have restricted the operation of
the rule so as not to apply to collections made by remittances
by draft of balances due on daily clearings.41
Until 1929 Missouri courts held as a matter of law that when
a customer of a bank indorses for deposit a check or draft, and
the bank gives immediate credit to the depositor's account with
unrestricted right to draw checks against the account, the bank
takes as owner and not as collection agent of the depositor, in
the absence of agreement to the contrary.42 In 1929 the legisla-
ture adopted the Bank Collection Code, which Missouri courts
interpret as changing the law as to the relation between the bank
and the depositor for collection. The bank of deposit is consti-
tuted the depositor's agent, and all subsequent collecting banks
his subagents, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary
and except as to certain subsequent holders. 43 A revocable credit
39. Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell (1899) 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W.
994, 71 Am. St. Rep. 608. See also Bank of Republic v. Republic State
Bank (1931) 328 Mo. 848, 47 S. W. (2d) 27, aff'g (1930) 24 S. W. (2d)
676. The liability of an indorsee for collection as trustee for the proceeds
in Missouri is discussed in a Note (1929) 14 ST. Louis LAW Rvwmv 406.
40. Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell, supra.
41. Farmers' Bank v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1929) 16 S. W. (2d) 642;
Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank (1931) 328 Mo. 848, 47 S. W.
(2d) 27. This latter case holds that American Bank v. People's Bank (Mo.
App. 1923) 255 S. W. 943, which denied preference in such a situation had
been overruled by the Bank of Poplar Bluff case (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281
S. W. 733, and abrogated by R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5565-75. The St.
Louis Court of Appeals in 1934 in McClure Garage v. Sturdivant Bank,
76 S. W. (2d) 438, continued to assert the validity of the American Bank
case, but such assertion was unnecessary to the decision. Powell Building
and Loan Ass'n v. Larabie Bro. Bankers (Mont. 1935) 46 P. (2d) 697,
discusses and disagrees with the Bank of Republic case, holding that the
plaintiff bank might demand cash in remittance, and the draft was accepted
at its own risk. It was pointed out that a different rule is held to apply
to transactions conducted through the mails and transactions over the
payor's counter, a distinction the Missouri courts refuse to consider.
42. Ayres v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (1883) 79 Mo. 421, 49 Am.
Rep. 235; Cairo Nat. Bank v. Blanton Co. (Mo. App. 1926) 287 S. W.
839; Foristel v. Security Nat. Bank etc. Co. (1928) 320 Mo. 639, 47 S. V.
(2d) 997; Nat. City Bank v. Macon Creamery Co. (1932) 329 Mo. 639,
46 S. W. (2d) 127, where the liability on the instruments involved accrued
in 1927.
43. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5567, 5569, construed and applied in Farmers'
Exchge. Bank v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n (1933) 332 Mo.
1041, 61 S. W. (2d) 717. See for an analysis of the code, Note (1932) 81
U. of Pa. Law Review 201; Comment (1933) 19 ST. Louis LAW Rvuiw. 147.
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is given except as to credit actually withdrawn and until actual
payment is made or unconditional credit is given.44
Under the Code where a bank receives an item for collection,
the agency relation continues to pervade the transaction even
after the collection is made and until the actual money is paid
or an unconditional credit is given. On failure of an agent col-
lecting bank before actual collection or payment, the item is to
be returned if still in the bank's possession to the forwarder or
presenter. On failure of any collecting bank after the proceeds
of the item are collected but before final payment or remittance
in money or unconditional credit, a trust attaches to the proceeds
in favor of the owner.' 5 This is true although the item collected
be one drawn on the collecting bank and it is collected by charg-
ing the item against the drawer's account, or if it be an item
payable at the collecting bank and it is collected by a check
drawn on it.46 It is true also whether the insolvency preceded
payment or remittance or intervened between attempted remit-
tance by draft and unsuccessful presentment of the draft for
payment. The trust fund is traceable into the bank commis-
sioner's hands provided the following conditions exist: (1) that
the item was forwarded for collection and remittance or pre-
sented for payment; (2) that the drawer of the check had a
sufficient balance with the collecting bank to authorize the charg-
ing of the item to his account; (3) that at the time of so charg-
44. Farmers' Exchge. Bank v. Farm & Home Savings & Loan Ass'n,
supra.
45. R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 5575. Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Sturdivant
Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 87 S. W. (2d) 1064; Mississippi Valley Trust Co.
v. West St. Louis Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 529; Texas
Co. v. First Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 28. The
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. case points out that the unconditional credit
which will create a debtor relation must be given on the bank's books or
books of any other bank and requested or accepted by the owner. The rule
was the same in Missouri before the adoption of the Code as to items de-
posited for collection and remittance of the collected proceeds. Bank of
Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (Mo. App. 1925) 275 S. W. 579, approved in
(1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733, 47 A. L. R. 754; Farmers' Trust Co.
v. Burnes Nat. Bank (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S. W. 110; Commerce Trust
Co. v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1933) 233 Mo. 979, 61 S. W. (2d) 928, 89
A. L. R. 373.
46. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, supra; Federal Reserve Bank
v. Millspaugh (1926) 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706; Federal Reserve Bank
v. Quigley (Mo. App. 1926) 284 S. W. 164; Gentry County Drainage Dist.
v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 882, 5 S. W. (2d)
1110; Carson Nat. Bank v. American Nat. Bank (1931) 225 Mo. App. 948,
34 S. W. (2d) 1143; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank (1931) 328
Mo. 848, 42 S. W. (2d) 27, aff'g (Mo. App. 1930) 24 S. W. (2d) 678;
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Sturdivant Bank, supra; Mississippi Valley Trust
Co. v. West St. Louis Trust Co., supra; Quaintance v. Moberly (Springfield
Ct. of App., 1937) not yet published.
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ing, the collecting bank had sufficient funds available to honor
the check; (4) that the bank which failed had at the time of
going into receivership sufficient funds on hand to pay the
amount collected.47 In these conditions the item received for
collection before insolvency is presumed in equity to have been
collected immediately and the proceeds held thereafter in trust
for the owner. 48 Of course, where the collecting bank receives
actual cash in payment of the item and fails to remit the proceeds
before insolvency, the owner is entitled to follow the proceeds as
a trust fund.49
IV. HOLDERS OF DRAFTS
A. Equitable Assignment of Collected Proceeds
A draft issued on another bank by the collecting bank in pay-
ment of the collection is held to be an equitable assignment in
favor of the forwarding bank for the amount thereof against
the funds in such other bank 0 The justification for holding that
such a draft operates as an equitable assignment pro tanto is
that the issuing bank is a trustee of the proceeds collected for
47. Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell (1899) 148 Mo. 358, 49 S. W. 994,
71 Am. St. Rep. 608; Thomson v. Bank of Syracuse (1926) 278 S. W.
810; Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, supra; Federal Reserve Bank v.
Quigley, supra; Farmers' Trust Co. v. Burnes Nat. Bank, supra; Kline v.
Cantley (Mo. App. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 526. Federal Reserve Bank v.Quigley, supra, construes requirement (4) not to demand that the failing
bank must have had sufficient funds in its own vaults if enough might be
found in its solvent correspondent banks as well.
48. Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (Mo. App. 1925) 275 S. W. 579,
approved in (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733, 47 A. L. R. 754; Farmers'
Trust Co. v. Burnes Nat. Bank (Mo. App. 1926) 285 S. W. 110. But see
McClure Garage v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 438.
49. German Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimble (1896) 66 Mo. App. 370; Thomson
v. Bank of Syracuse (1926) 220 Mo. App. 805, 278 S. W. 810; Fidelity Nat.
Bank & Trust Co. v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W.
(2d) 1090, followed in (Mo. App. 1932) 47 S. W. (2d) 1114; Texas Co. v.
First Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 28.
50. Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926) 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W.
706; Gentry County Drainage Dist. v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank (1928)
222 Mo. App. 882, 5 S. W. (2d) 1110; State Farmers' Mutual Tornado
Ins. Co. v. Cantley (1928) 222 Mo. App. 839, 6 S. W. (2d) 970; Carson
National Bank v. American Nat. Bank (1931) 225 Mo. App. 948, 34 S. W.(2d) 143; Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank (1931) 328 Mo. 848,
42 S. W. (2d) 27. This latter case admits an inconsistency in the Missouri
holdings that a purchaser of a draft payable to self is but a general
creditor of a bank, but a depositor for collection who directs the proceeds
to be remitted by draft to him as a beneficiary entitled to a preference on
insolvency. See 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed. 1928) 600, sec. 248.
State Farmers' Mutual Tornado Ins. Co. v. Cantley, supra, holds that
Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, supra, overrules Dickinson v. Coates(1883) 79 Mo. 250, 49 Am. Rep. 228, and Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Coates(1883) 79 Mo. 168. This may be doubted however inasmuch as neither of
the latter cases involved collection.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss2/11
remittance; the draft is then regarded as drawn against the
payee's funds. Furthermore the draft can be but a conditional
payment to the collection agent, who is only authorized by the
depositor to accept cash.5' Even though the forwarding bank
requests remittance by draft or exchange on another bank, the
collecting bank remains an agent and trustee; if the paper is
dishonored, the draft is charged back, and the holder is entitled
to a preference.52 A collecting bank which violates the deposi-
tor's instructions as to the application of the proceeds is con-
sistently held by Missouri courts to be a trustee of the misapplied
funds on its subsequent insolvency."3
Missouri courts, liberal in finding an equitable assignment
before the Bank Collection Code was adopted, have outdone them-
selves in construing section 11 of that article in favor of pre-
ferred claimants who have received drafts in payment of items
presented at the drawee or payor bank.54 Cases before and after
the code hold that a payee of a check who accepts a draft in
payment thereof so that he may send the money to another bank
is entitled to a preference when payment of the draft is refused
because of the intervening insolvency of the bank. The court
holds that the bank is an agent of the holder of the check for
its collection, and the draft is an equitable assignment of suffi-
cient funds to pay it on presentment. 5 A line of recent cases
holds that a draft accepted in payment of a check but after an
original demand for cash constitutes an equitable assignment in
favor of the demnandant. 6 The most recent extension of this
doctrine was made by the St. Louis Court of Appeals, which
allowed a preference to an indorsee of a check who requested
51. Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank, supra; Carson Nat. Bank
v. American Nat. Bank, supra.
52. Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh (1926) 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W.
706. The decided weight of authority outside of Missouri denies a prefer-
ence in these circumstances. See cases cited in Braver, Liquidation of Finan-
cial Institutions (1936) 739, sec. 640.
53. Thomson v. Bank of Syracuse (1926) 220 Mo. App. 805, 278 S. W.
810; Noll v. Harrison County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 923, 11 S. W.
(2d) 73; Schreier v. Joplin State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d)
179.
54. Section 11 of the Code is R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 5575.
55. Gentry County Drainage Dist. v. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank (1928)
222 Mo. App. 882, 5 S. W. (2d) 1110; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Sturdivant
Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 87 S. W. (2d) 1064. The Gentry case said that
Carmichael v. Tishomingo Banking Co. (Mo. App. 1917) 191 S. W. 1043,
which denied a preference in a similar situation was overruled in effect
by Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W.
733, 47 A. L. R. 754.
56. Thomson v. Bank of Gerster (Mo. App. 1934) 74 S. W. (2d) 74;
In re Hodiamont Bank (1936) 230 Mo. App. 190, 91 S. W. (2d) 127;
Quaintance v. Moberly (Springfield Ct. of App., 1937) not yet published.
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and accepted a cashier's check in payment thereof when insol-
vency of the payor bank intervened before the cashier's check
was paid25
B. Purchase of Drafts
It is, however, everywhere held that a purchaser for value
of a draft or a check from a bank in the usual course of business
and without any special agreement is a general creditor of the
bank with no preferential rights if the bank becomes insolvent
before the paper is paid, although the drawer bank had sufficient
funds in the drawee bank to pay the holder 8 Such a draft or
check does not effect a pro tanto assignment, whether purchased
by check drawn on his account by a depositor"' or by cash paid
by one not a depositor.6° Notwithstanding the rule Missouri
courts have held that a depositor who issues a check to his bank
for a cashier's check payable to another has a preferred claim
when the bank fails after charging the depositor's account but
before the cashier's check is cleared ;61 that priority is given a
claimant who is given a draft on surrender of her time certificate,
where the draft is dishonored because of the intervening insolv-
ency of the drawer bank;6 2 and that the holder of a check who
57. Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. West St. Louis Trust Co. (Mo. App.
1937) 103 S. W. (2d) 529. The request for the cashier's check was held
presentment of the item for payment within the meaning of R. S. Mo.(1929) sec. 5575 (2), and of the acceptance of the cashier's check was held
not to constitute receipt of unconditional credit within the statute.
58. Dickinson v. Coates (1883) 79 Mo. 250, 49 Am. Rep. 228 (cashier's
check); Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Coates (1883) 79 Mo. 168 (same); In re
Wells-Hine Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1930) 32 S. W. (2d) 1093 (draft);
Cormaney v. Wells-Hine Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 172(draft); Wheelock v. Cantley (1923) 227 Mo. App. 102, 50 S. W. (2d) 731(certificate of deposit purchased by agent and sent to principal); In re
Hodiamont Bank (1936) 230 Mo. App. 190, 91 S. W. (2d) 127 (cashier's
check); Smalley v. Queen City Bank (Mo. App. 1936) 94 S. W. (2d) 954.
See 2 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed. 1928) 1109, sec. 493 et seq.;
Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions (1936) 787, sec. 677, for hold-
ings elsewhere.
59. Cormaney v. Wells-Hine Trust Co., supra; Banker of M. W. of A. v.
Harrison (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d) 486; Smalley v. Queen City Bank,
supra.
60. McClure Garage v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d)
438; Huffman v. Sturdivant Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 441. In
the McClure case, the court says at p. 441: "We are unable to agree with
those cases that raise a fictitious agential status of a bank from -whom a
draft is purchased, in order to facilitate the obtainment of a preference."
61. Fletcher v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1932) 47 S. W. (2d) 217. The court
here held the deposit became special by virtue of the transaction, the bank
holding only for the purpose of transmission. Banker of M. W. of A. v.
Harrison (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d) 486 distinguishes the Fletcher
case solely on the ground that the cashier's check was payable to a third
person in the latter case.
62. Householder v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1930) 27 S. W. (2d) 1930. It is
submitted that this is a flagrant departure from the rule.
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requests payment via cashier's check from the drawee bank is
entitled to preference on insolvency which precedes payment of
the cashier's check.6 3
V. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS
A. Refusal of Payment on Checks
Practically all jurisdictions outside of Missouri hold that mere
refusal of a bank to pay checks or deposits on demand does not
convert the bank from a debtor into a constructive trustee of
the fund withheld, so as to entitle the demandant to a preference
for that amount if the bank becomes insolvent.64 Missouri, how-
ever, has by an unbroken line of decisions committed itself to a
contrary doctrine.6 5 The cases strongly assert the bank's duty
to pay checks presented by the holder while the bank is a going
concern, if there are sufficient funds of the drawer on hand. 6
Thus while a corporation is empowered to make by-laws for the
management of its affairs,67 a bank cannot lawfully restrict
amounts withdrawable by its depositors while it remains open
for business, and its assests are unaffected by liens or process
of law. 8 Refusal of payment of a check or matured time certifi-
cate pursuant to such a restriction accordingly converts the
money withheld into a trust fund recoverable as such by the
depositor, 9 notwithstanding the Missouri statute prohibiting as-
63. Supra, note 57.
64. Braver, Liquidation of Financial Institutions (1936) 830, see. 711.
65. Claxton v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 975; Johnson v.
Farmers' Bank (1928) 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090; Hiatt v.
Miller Bank et al. (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1040, 34 S. W. (2d) 532; Koehler
v. Joplin State Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 68 S. W. (2d) 728; Kahmann v.
Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 858; Farmers' Bank v. Moberly
(Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 906; Bank of Illmo v. Sturdivant Bank
(Mo. App. 1936) 89 S. W. (2d) 560; McQuerry v. Bank of Eldorado Springs
(Mo. App. 1936) 96 S. W. (2d) 515.
66. O'Grady v. Stotts City Bank (1904) 106 Mo. App. 366, 80 S. W.
777; Allen Gro. Co. v. Bank of Buchanan County (1916) 192 Mo. App.
476, 182 S. W. 777; Waggoner v. Bank of Bernie (1926) 220 Mo. App. 165,
281 S. W. 130. See Hiatt v. Miller Bank (1931) 224 Mo. App. 1040, 34
S. W. (2d) 532, for the interesting holding that retention by the bank of
the check for seven days after presentment was equivalent, not to accep-
tance, but refusal, and entitled the plaintiff to preference on the subsequent
insolvency of the bank. See also dicta in In re Farmers' & Merchants'
Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 83 S. W. (2d) 198, holding that the drawee bank
is a trustee of the amount of a check received by mail in the regular
process of collection before final closing if sufficient funds were at hand
to pay it. The claimant failed to prove the check reached the bank before
it closed.
67. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 4555. Barnett Gro. Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Faris
etc. Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 875.
68. Farmers' Bank v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 906.
69. Claxton v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 975; Kahmann v.
Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 858; Barnett Gro. Co. v. Brinker-
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signment of bank's assets to one creditor in preference to others.
70
The demand, which may be oral71 or written172 must be a
present demand for a definite amount to bring the claimant with-
in the preferred status on the bank's refusal.73 When a deposi-
tor's check on his account is paid by a draft on another bank in
which there were sufficient funds to meet the check, but the draft
is refused because of the intervening insolvency of the drawer
bank, the depositor'is held entitled to a preference. The case is
treated as if the insolvent bank has simply refused payment of
the check while having sufficient funds.7 4
The fact that the bank is insolvent or may become so by pay-
ment of the demand does not affect the plaintiff's right to a
preference.75 The legal effect of the wrongful act of the bank
in refusing to pay the check is to swell the assets of the bank
at the time of its closing in the same amount ;76 and the bank
by operation of law holds, in the capacity of a trustee, the de-
positor's funds to the amount of the check.77
B. Deposits Pending Insolvency
When a bank reaches insolvency, the officers and agents of
the bank should close its doors and place it in the hands of the
hoff-Faris Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 875; Farmers' Bank v.
Moberly, supra; Laclede Trust Co. v. Rodenberg (Mo. App. 1936) 93 S. W.(2d) 55. In the Claxton case the fact that plaintiff signed an agreement
to leave the deposit for a certain time but without specifying the percentage
of the deposit withdrawable was held ineffectual as a contract or as an
estoppel binding the plaintiff.
70. R. S. Mo. (1929) 5318.
71. Blackshaw v. French (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 916; Bank of
Illmo v. Bank of Sturdivant (Mo. App. 1936) 89 S. W. (2d) 510.
72. Claxton v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 975.
73. Langhorst v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 119.
74. Thomson v. Bank of Gerster (Mo. App. 1934) 74 S. W. (2d) 74;Quaintance v. Moberly (Springfield Ct. of App. 1937) not yet published.
The Thomson case is distinguished from Cormaney v. Wells-Hine Trust Co.
(Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 172, on the ground that here the plain-
tiff's original intent was not to purchase a draft. See also In re Hodiamont
Bank (1936) 230 Mo. App. 190, 91 S. W. (2d) 127, where a cashier's check
was issued in payment of a depositor's check.
75. Kahmann v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 858; Barnett
Gro. Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 875.
See also Linhart v. Farmers' State Bank (1931) 226 Mo. App. 588, 43
S. W. (2d) 1062, where preference was denied however because the check
was presented via mail after the close of the last business day; and Farm-
ers' Bank v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 906, where it was
held that the obtaining of a moratorium after the depositor's demand could
not affect his right to a preference created by the prior refusal.
76. Claxton v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 975; Johnson v.
Farmers' Bank (1928) 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090.
77. Farmers' Bank v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 906. See
also In re Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 83 S. W. (2d)
198, where preference was nevertheless denied because no presentment be-
fore closing shown.
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commissioner78 By keeping the doors open to depositors and
claimants, the officers impliedly represent that the bank is sol-
vent. A bank which accepts deposits when it is hopelessly insol-
vent to the knowledge of its officers is held a trustee ex maleficio
even of general deposits made by one without knowledge of the
bank's condition. Fraud on the part of the bank prevents the
presumed intent of the parties to enter a debtor-creditor rela-
tionship from taking effect, and equity treats the deposit as a
trust res which may be followed by the depositor into the hands
of the bank commissioner.79 Analogous are cases where money
is lent a bank by reason of fraudulent representations of its
officers. The defrauded lender in such cases is allowed a prefer-
ential claim.80
The plaintiff must actually deposit money or its equivalent,
or the bank must hold money for payment, which payment is
treated as made and the money redeposited at the date of in-
solvency.9 ' The insolvency of the bank must be contempora-
neous with the acceptance of the deposit, not subsequent, to make
the bank a constructive trustee.82 Of course fraud is never pre-
sumed, but the burden is on the depositor to show actual knowl-
edge on the part of officials that the bank is hopelessly and irre-
trievably insolvent.83 Proof of financial embarrassment or simple
insolvency is insufficient; but the officers must have reasonable
hopes of securing adequate assistance or of recovering solvency
by continuing business to justify the conclusion that they ac-
78. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5318.
79. Fisse v. Dietrich (1877) 3 Mo. App. 584; Turner v. Farmers' Exchge.
Bank (1932) 226 Mo. App. 714, 45 S. W. (2d) 1084; Ronchetto v. State
Bank (1932) 227 Mo. App. 83, 51 S. W. (2d) 174; Catron v. Harrison (Mo.
App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 173; Hennemann v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App.
1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 113; Langhorst v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935)
78 S. W. (2d) 119; Miller v. Farmers' Exchange Bank (Mo. App. 1937)
107 S. W. (2d) 852.
80. West End Bank v. University City Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App.
1936) 97 S. W. (2d) 881; Fonville v. Citizens' Bank of Senath (Mo. App.
1937) 99 S. W. (2d) 502.
81. Cottondale Planting Co. v. Diehlstadt (1926) 220 Mo. App. 265, 286
S. W. 425; Hennemann v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d)
113. Thus a renewal of a time certificate at the time the bank was known
to be insolvent did not convert the general deposit represented thereby into
a trust fund entitled to preference.
82. Hennemann v. Rosebud Bank, supra; Langhorst v. Rosebud Bank
(Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 119. See also State v. Sanford (1927) 317
Mo. 865, 297 S. W. 73.
83. May v. Bank of Hughesville (Mo. App. 1927) 291 S. W. 170; Ron-
chetto v. State Bank (1932) 227 Mo. App. 83, 51 S. W. (2d) 174; Lang-
horst v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 119; Miller v.
Farmers' Exchange Bank (Mo. App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 852. Lack of
ordinary diligence on the part of the depositor to discover the insolvency
is no bar to his right to recover according to the latter case.
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cepted the deposit without knowledge or sufficient reason to know
that they would not and could not pay on the depositor's de-
mand 84 The liability of the bank as a constructive trustee may
be grounded on the knowledge of any agent of the bank acting
within the scope of his authority in conducting the transaction
with the plaintiff.8 5
C. Fraudulent Sale of Drafts
The law is generally settled that where a bank, knowing or
having reason to know of its insolvency, sells a draft for value,
the bank is held to have received the money fraudulently and
holds it as constructive trustee for the purchaser, who may
rescind the purchase and recover the money paid therefor."
The question of sufficiency of funds in the drawee bank becomes
immaterial when the bank is insolvent, inasmuch as the statute
requires the drawee bank on notice from the bank commissioner
to refuse to make any payment, advance, or clearance out of the
closed bank's funds.8 7
Sale of a draft within one hour before the bank was closed
by an order of the directors has been held to have been made
presumptively with knowledge of insolvency.8 However for there
to be a fraudulent sale, the knowledge of the officers must include
reasonable cause to believe that the draft will not be paid. With-
out evidence of such knowledge, evidence of sufficient funds to
meet the draft in the drawee bank has been held not to entitle
a purchaser by check of a draft to a preference.9 Issuance of a
draft in pursuance of a depositor's oral demand is fraudulent
if the bank knows that there are insufficient funds to meet the
draft, and the depositor's account is entitled to a preference on
the insolvency of the bank.9' On the other hand the transfer or
84. May v. Bank of Hughesville, supra; Ronchetto v. State Bank, supra.
85. Ronchetto v. State Bank, supra; Catron v. Harrison (Mo. App. 1933)
63 S. W. (2a) 173; Langhorst v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W.(2d) 119. The knowledge of the bank directors is not required unless action
is brought on the ground of the statutory liability of a director for the
wrongful acceptance of deposits by his bank. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5381;
White v. Poole (Mo. App. 1925) 272 S. W. 1021.
86. Stoller v. Coates (1885) 88 Mo. 514; St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co.
v. Millspaugh (1926) 220 Mo. App. 110, 278 S. W. 786; Blackshaw v.
French (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 916; Missouri P. S. Co. v. Cantley
(Mo. App. 1932) 57 S. W. (2d) 755, In re Hodiamont Bank (1936) 230
Mo. App. 190, 91 S. W. (2d) 127.
87. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co. v. Millspaugh, supra. See R. S. Mo.
(1929) secs. 5316 (3), 5326.
88. Missouri P. S. Co. v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1933) 57 S. W. (2d) 755.
89. Corinaney v. Wells-Hine Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d)
172.
90. Blackshaw v. French (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 916.
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extension of credit in exchange for a check of an insolvent bank
has been held not such a purchase as will entitle the transferor-
payee to a preference for the amount of the check on its dis-
honor because of insufficient funds. The check was regarded as
no more than an attempt to discharge the indebtedness incurred
by receiving the credit of the payee bank,'
VI. PUBLIC FUNDS
A. Priorities of the Sovereign
Thus far this discussion has related only to preferences given
private funds. However, a Missouri statute declares that debts
due the state shall be first satisfied when a debtor becomes in-
solvent.92 The priority so declared is held to be against general
creditors only, not against other preferred claimants.9 3
The Missouri Supreme Court thus allows the state tax col-
lector to proceed for the collection of the tax on shares of bank
stock out of the bank's assets, even in the hands of the bank
commissioner.9 4 In bringing such suit, the state is not bound
by the statutes of limitations and other procedural requirements
which must be followed by other preferred claimants . 5
The supreme court however declined to enforce the statutory
preference as to lawful deposits by the state treasurer for the
reason that the right was abrogated or waived by the enactment
of the state depository law, and its requirement of security from
its depositories.9 6 The statutory preference, however, was ex-
91. Bank of Portland v. McCredie Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 119, 300
S. W. 1018. It is interesting that this case distinguishes Bank of Poplar
Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733, 47 A. L. R. 754,
approving (Mo. App. 1925) 275 S. W. 579, and cites as its only authority
American Bank v. People's Bank (Mo. App. 1923) 255 S. W. 943. Yet the
Supreme Court in Bank of Republic v. Republic State Bank (1931) 328
Mo. 848, 42 S. W. (2d) 27, 31, declared that the American Bank case was
overruled by the Poplar Bluff case.
92. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 3152.
93. State ex rel. Becker v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1932) 331 Mo. 689,
56 S. W. (2d) 129, citing and construing R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5300,
5303, 5331. See also In re Mt. Vernon Bank (1933) 334 Mo. 549, 66 S. W.(2d) 850.
94. The Court construes the statute taxing shares of bank stock as mak-
ing the bank directly responsible for the payment of the taxes.
95. State ex rel. Wyatt v. Cantley (1930) 325 Mo. 67, 26 S. W. (2d)
976; State ex rel. Graves v. Farmers' Trust Co. (Mo. 1930) 31 S. W. (2d)
1069. See however State v. Bank of Southeast Missouri (Mo. 1937) 107
S. W. (2d), where statutory lien for corporation franchise tax against
bank was not allowed to attach to assets of another bank to which taxed
bank transferred its assets.
96. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 11465-11477. In re Holland Banking Co.
(1926) 313 Mo. 301, 281 S. W. 702; State ex rel. Becker v. Farmers' Exchge.
Bank (1932) 331 Mo. 689, 56 S. W. (2d) 850. To hold that the state, a
secured depositor, should be allowed to assert priority as to the unpledged
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tended to an unauthorized deposit of motor vehicle license fees
by an agent of the secretary of state.9 7
The attitude of Missouri courts toward a deposit of war risk
insurance or veteran's compensation money made as a general
deposit by the legal representative of a recipient of such com-
pensation has been uncertain. The latest case follows the general
weight of authority in holding, that such deposit is not a debt
due the United States and not entitled to priority of payment
as such in the case of the bank's insolvency. The deposit by the
guardian of the beneficiary creates no more than a debtor-credi-
tor relationship."8 Two earlier Missouri cases declare that the
proceeds of war risk insurance are funds of the United States
and preferred as such until they have reached the hands of the
beneficiary, even though in one case the funds were deposited in
a bank by the personal representative of the insured.9
B. Deposits of Non-Sovereign Political Units
A deposit of any public corporation or political subdivision of
the state does not come within the scope of the statutory prefer-
ence. 00 A lawful and general deposit of public funds, other than
state or national moneys, in a qualified depository therefore cre-
ates but a debtor-creditor relationship.' While a literal compli-
assets of a bank is inequitable and tends to prejudice the banks as deposi-
tories for the ordinary depositor.
97. State ex rel. Becker v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank, supra.
98. Parker v. Central Trust Co. (1934) 229 Mo. App. 1244, 71 S. W.(2d) 106. A federal statute provides for priority for the payment of debts
of the United States out of the assets of any insolvent debtor. (1797) 1
Stat. 515, 31 U. S. C. A. sec. 191. This case follows and holds as controlling
Spiser v. Smith (1933) 288 U. S. 430, 53 S. Ct. 415, 57 L. ed. 875, 84
A. L. R. 1525. This undoubtedly is the Missouri law today. See comment
(1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 211.
99. Butler v. Cantley (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1047, 47 S. W. (2d) 258;
(deposit of war risk insurance money by administrator of deceased soldier's
estate); Duzan v. Cantley (1932) 227 Mo. App. 670, 55 S. W. (2d) 711(time deposit of funds derived from a war risk policy made by the bene-
ficiary of the policy). The Butler case is difficult to reconcile with the
rule that money in the guardian's hands is money in the ward's hands.
Salee v. Arnold (1862) 32 Mo. 532. Preferred standing of course was
denied in the Duzan case inasmuch as the beneficiary had received the
money.
100. Boone County v. Cantley (1932) 333 Mo. App. 911, 51 S. W. (2d)
56; In re Citizens' Bank of Senath (Mo. App. 1937) and cases cited. See
also State v. Rubey (1883) 77 Mo. 610; State v. Wilson (1883) 77 Mo. 633.
A surety paying deposit in an insolvent bank of a school district or of a
county treasurer is subrogated to no more than a pro rata share of assets
with general depositors. In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931)
39 S. W. (2d) 1415.
1. Henry County v. Salmon (1907) 201 Mo. 136, 100 S. W. 20; Boone
County v. Cantley (1932) 330 Mo. 911, 51 S. W. (2d) 56; Ralls County v.
Commissioner of Finance (1933) 334 Mo. 167, 66 S. W. (2d) 115. In re
Citizens' Bank of Senath (Mo. App. 1937) 102 S. W. (2d) 830.
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ance with all statutory provisions is not required by some cases
for the deposit to be lawful,2 the noncompliance must not preju-
dice any public or private rights. Thus the security demanded
by the statute must conform literally to the requirements)
A deposit of any public funds in violation of statutory stipula-
tions is wrongful, and the bank is held to be a constructive
trustee as to them. Public funds so held on insolvency are en-
titled to priority of payment over those of general creditors.4
The bank is chargeable with knowledge of the statutory require-
ments,, and approval of statutory violations on the part of the
officials depositing does not work an estoppel of any preferential
claim as to funds wrongfully deposited.6
Where, contrary to the order of authorities to distribute public
money in named depositories, the entire sum was deposited in
2. Henry County v. Salmon, supra; Aurora v. Bank of Aurora (1932)
227 Mo. App. 343, 52 S. W. (2d) 496; Marion County v. First Savings
Bank (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 861. See also the broad but doubtful lan-
guage of In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d)
415, disapproved in In re Cameron Trust Co. (1932) 330 Mo. 1070, 51 S. W.(2d) 1025.
3. Boone v. Cantley (1932) 330 Mo. 911, 51 S. W. (2d) 56; White v.
Greenlee (Mo. 1935) 85 S. W. (2d) 112. So a failure to advertise for bids
has also been held not be substantial compliance, though bond is given. In
re Cameron Trust Co., supra; Aurora School District v. Bank of Aurora(1932) 227 Mo. App. 339, 52 S. W. (2d) 484. See R. S. Mo. (1929) sec.
12184.
4. Special Road Dist. No. 4 v. Cantley (1928) 223 Mo. App. 89, 8 S. W.(2d) 944; Huntsville Trust Co. v. Noel (1928) 321 Mo. 749, 12 S. W. (2d)
751; State ex rel. Gentry v. Page Bank (1929) 322 Mo. 29, 14 S. W. (2d)
597; Consolidated School District No. 4 v. Citizens' Bank (1929) 223 Mo.
App. 940, 21 S. W. (2d) 781; Clearmont School Dist. v. Jackson (Mo. App.
1931) 37 S. W. (2d) 1006; Harrison Tp., Vernon County v. People's State
Bank (1932) 329 Mo. 968, 46 S. W. (2d) 165; Consolidated School Dist.
No. 5 v. Parma Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 425; Deal v. Bank
of Smithville (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 201; In re Liquidation of
Gower Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 55 S. W. (2d) 713; State ex rel. Becker v.
Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1932) 331 Mo. 689, 56 S. W. (2d) 129; Mitchell
v. Bank of Ava (1933) 333 Mo. 960, 65 S. W. (2d) 99; Rals County v.
Comm'r of Finance (1933) 334 Mo. 167, 66 S. W. (2d) 115; Dobyns v.
Bank of Ava (Mo. App. 1937) 99 S. W. (2d) 495. See Braver, Liquidation
of Financial Institutions (1936) 508, sec. 465 for a host of citations from
other jurisdictions.
5. Macon v. Farmers' Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 643;
Marion County v. First Savings Bank (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 861.
6. Maryville v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1932) 226 Mo. App. 641, 45 S. W.(2d) 103; Marion County v. First Savings Bank (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d)
861. But see In re North Missouri Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W.(2d) 415. Cantley v. Beard (Mo. 1936) 98 S. W. (2d) 730 is interesting
for the holding that a county was not entitled to a lien on notes on insol-
vency of the bank, although the notes were purchased by authority of the
county court with county funds deposited in an unlawful depository. The
county should have proceeded for a preference instead of seeking to hold
the notes which constituted assets of the bank.
19381 NOTES
Washington University Open Scholarship
228 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 23
one bank, the overdeposit was held illegal and the bank taking
with knowledge of the order was deemed a trustee ex mleficio.7
Again, an overdeposit in violation of a statute expressly forbid-
ding it creates a constructive trust fund, though the bank is a
lawful depository up to the statutory amount."
A subsequent failure on the part of the official custodian to
withdraw the public funds on the failure of the duly selected
depository to renew its bond at the expiration of its term does
not convert the debt created by the original deposit into a trust
fund entitled to preferred treatment on insolvency.9 However,
a deposit by a political subdivision in a bank that had failed to
comply with statutory requirements as to filing a bond was held
converted by the subsequent filing of an acceptable bond from a
trust fund in the bank's hands to a legal general deposit.10
Statutes which merely authorize without requiring public offi-
cials to select a legal depository for public moneys are held direc-
tory not mandatory.11 Consequently a deposit of public funds
by an official custodian in his own name in a bank not selected
or qualified under such a statute is nonetheless lawful and not
entitled to preference.22 So also a deposit by a village treasurer
of public funds, without having given bond under a statute con-
7. William R. Compton Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1926) 220 Mo. App.
1081, 279 S. W. 746. Where, however, the bank is legally designated as
depository of one-half of certain funds, the fact that the other half in
another bank becomes less does not constitute the bank holding the greater
portion a constructive trustee if the statutory bond is sufficient; this is
true though the latter bank has requested no withdrawals be made from
its half of the deposit. Polk County v. Farmers' State Bank (Mo. 1935)
82 S. W. (2d) 577.
8. Marion County v. First Savings Bank (Mo. 1935) 80 S. W. (2d) 861.
9. Ralls County v. Commissioner of Finance (1933) 334 Mo. 167, 66
S. W. (2d) 115. 3. Frank speaking for Div. 1 here questions the soundness
of White v. Greenlee (1932) 330 Mo. 135, 49 S. W. (2d) 132, decided by
Div. 2, and holding that substitution by a qualified and selected bank of an
insufficient bond for the statutory bond with approval of public authorities
constituted the entire deposit a preferred claim or insolvency of the bank.
10. Mitchell v. Bank of Ava (1933) 330 Mo. 960, 65 S. W. (2d) 99.
11. City of Aurora v. Bank of Aurora (1932) 227 Mo. App. 343, 52
S. W. (2d) 496.
12. In re Hunters' Bank of New Madrid (1930) 224 Mo. App. 550, 30
S. W. (2d) 782; City of Doniphan v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1913) 52 S. W.
(2d) 417; Everton Special Road Dist. v. Bank of Everton (Mo. App. 1932)
55 S. W. (2d) 335; In re Home Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 69 S. W. (2d)
312, aff'd in City of Fulton v. Home Trust Co. (Mo. 1934) 78 S. W. (2d)
445. A statute requiring the funds of a third class city to be deposited in
a selected city depository was held in the latter case to be limited to the
funds of the city under the control of the city treasurer as custodian of
the city's funds, and not to apply to those in the city collector's possession
before time he was required by law to deliver them to the city treasurer.
A previous practice by the collector (without special agreement) of leav-
ing such funds overtime in a bank not a designated depository was held
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strued as directory, was not given preference on insolvency of
the bank.13 The ordinary rule, however, is that a deposit by a
treasurer without the required statutory bond is unlawful, and
the banks holds such a deposit as constructive trustee.'4 Illegally
deposited funds may be legally withdrawn by the official cus-
todian. In such a case the bank is not responsible for subsequent
misappropriation by the custodian of the withdrawn funds.1 5
VII. DEPOSITS OF FIDUCIARIES
Funds held in a fiduciary capacity ordinarily may be deposited
in a general deposit without committing a breach of duty, and
the presumption in favor of a general deposit obtains in the case
of a deposit by a fiduciary. The fact that the bank knows of
the nature of the fund does not convert the general deposit to
a special one entitled to priority on liquidation. 6 Before money
in an insolvent bank may be received on the trust fund theory,
the claimant must show facts that the bank itself held it other
than as a general deposit. 17
not to entitle the city to a preference where the bank became insolvent be-
fore the expiration of the period allowed for paying over.
Where, however, there is an agreement by the bank to hold such funds
beyond the time when the statute requires them to be paid over to the city
treasurer, the deposit is unlawful and the city is entitled to a preference
on the insolvency of the bank. Maryville v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1932) 226
Mo. App. 641, 45 S. W. (2d) 103.
13. In re Bank of Mt. Moriah's Liquidation (1932) 226 Mo. App. 1230,
49 S. W. (2d) 275.
14. Everton Special Road District v. Bank of Everton (Mo. App. 1932)
55 S. W. (2d) 335; City of Doniphan v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1932) 52 S. W.(2d) 417; School Dist. No. 61 v. Railey & Bro. Banking Co. (1932) 227
Mo. App. 543, 55 S. W. (2d) 699; Portageville v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.
(1933) 228 Mo. App. 1, 63 S. W. (2d) 411; Portageville v. Harrison (1933)
228 Mo. App. 27, 63 S. W. (2d) 410.
15. School Dist. v. Railey & Bro. Banking Co., supra. See R. S. Mo.
(1929) sec. 3144. In this connection, however, it may be noted that where
an unauthorized agent indorsed a company check and thus unlawfully paid
by the drawee bank, on misappropriation by the agent the company was
entitled to a preference on the bank's insolvency. New York Indemnity Co.
v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1932) 227 Mo. App. 55, 51 S. W. (2d) 701.
16. Fred A. Boswell Post v. Farmers' State Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 61
S. W. (2d) 761; Round Prairie Bank v. Downey (Mo. App. 1933) 64 S. W.
(2d) 701; Moehlenkamp v. Savings Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1937) 108 S. W.
(2d) 605. See also Greene County Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Cantley (1933)
228 Mo. App. 14, 62 S. W. (2d) 931; Missouri Utilities Co. v. Scott County
Bank (Mo. App. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d) 933; Landwehr v. Moberly (1936)
338 Mo. 1106, 93 S. W. (2d) 935. This is the established general rule. Re-
statement, Trusts (1985) sec. 12, comment h.
17. Paul v. Draper (1900) 158 Mo. 177, 59 S. W. 77, 81 Am. St. Rep.
296; Missouri Mutual Ass'n v. Holland Banking Co. (1927) 220 Mo. App.
1256, 290 S. W. 100; Lloyds' Ins. Co. v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1935) 82 S. W.
(2d) 139; West St. Louis Trust Co. v. Brokaw (Mo. App. 1937) 102 S. W.
(2d) 792; Security Nat. Bank etc. Co. v. Moberly (Mo. 1936) 101 S. W.
(2d) 33, and cases cited. In the Lloyds case a surety on a bond securing
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A wrongful, unauthorized deposit by a fiduciary in a bank
which has knowledge of the facts becomes a trust fund which
the owner may reclaim in the hands of the bank commissioner. 18
While a guardian is under statutory duty to invest the money
of his ward in specified ways,-9 the statute does not make illegal
a deposit in the bank until appropriate investments may be ob-
tained, and no preference may be predicated on such deposit.20
However, a loan to a bank or a time deposit is an unlawful in-
vestment under the statute. The bank, being chargeable with
knowledge of the statute and of facts known to its officials deal-
ing with the guardian, is liable as constructive trustee of the
ward's money, and the ward may claim a preference on insol-
vency notwithstanding the guardian's liability on his bond.21
Ratification of the fiduciary or authorization by the court of an
unlawful deposit is no defense for the bank and no estoppel of
the ward.22 Nor can the fact that a bank commingles with its
general funds money which it holds in a fiduciary capacity de-
feat the preferential right of the ward or beneficiary or insol-
vency of the bank.2
VIII. BAILMENTS
A deposit of bonds and securities for safekeeping does not
create a debtor-creditor relationship nor a trustee-beneficiary re-
a guardian's deposit and under agreement with the bank not to allow with-
drawals without the surety's consent was held but a general creditor of
the insolvent bank on its insolvency after the bank had violated the agree-
ment by allowing the guardian to withdraw and misappropriate the fund.
18. In re Linn County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 84, 1 S. W. (2d) 206;
Andrews v. Farmers' Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1929) 21 S. W. (2d) 641; Round
Prairie Bank v. Downey, supra; French v. Harrison (Mo. App. 1934) 70
S. W. (2d) 141; Happy v. Cole County Bank (Mo. 1936) 93 S. W. (2d)
871. Of course if the claimant can not show the bank's knowledge of the
misappropriation of the fund by the fiduciary, he can claim no preference
on insolvency of the bank. Plattner v. People's Bank (Mo. App. 1934) 71
S. W. (2d) 75 (misappropriation by a partner of partnership funds).
19. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 418.
20. Parker v. Central Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1934) 71 S. W. (2d) 106;
Bartholomy v. Harrison (Mo. App. 1934) 74 S. W. (2d) 69.
21. Round Prairie Bank v. Downey (Mo. App. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d)
701; Hart v. Kirksville Savings Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 82 S. W. (2d) 612.
See also Methodist Benev. Ass'n v. Bank of Sweet Springs (1932) 227 Mo.
App. 566, 54 S. W. (2d) 474. It may be noted here that deposits by school
children of their own money were held beneficial and therefore lawful, and
the bank did not take as constructive trustee merely because their deposi-
tors were minors. Phillips v. Savings Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1935) 85 S. W.
(2d) 923.
22. Hart v. Kirksville Savings Bank, supra.
23. Methodist Benevolent Ass'n v. Bank of Sweet Springs (1932) 227
Mo. App. 566, 54 S. W. (2d) 474 (bank was testamentary trustee); Mc-
Pheeters v. Scott County (Mo. App. 1933) 63 S. W. (2d) 456 (bank was
trustee under oral agreement with depositor); Round Prairie Bank v.
Downey (Mo. App. 1933) 64 S. W. (2d) 701.
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lationship, but rather that of bailor-bailee. On insolvency of the
bank the owner of the bonds must in every jurisdiction trace
either the bonds or, if they have been misappropriated, the pro-
ceeds therefrom into the hands of the bank commissioner to be
entitled to a preferred claim on the bonds.2 4 However, if there
is no contrary showing, the liberal Missouri courts allow an
inference that bonds in the hands of the bank before it closed
have passed to the hands of the bank commissioner, and permit
a preference on the basis of a general augmentation of assets if
only sufficient assets reach the commissioner. 25
When a note deposited in a safety box was wrongfully removed
and misappropriated by the bank, a constructive trust was cre-
ated in law in favor of the owner of the note who was entitled
to a preference on the ground of the augmentation of the bank's
assets by the transaction. 26
IX. ESTOPPEL OF CLAIMANTS
A claimant is not estopped to assert a right to a preference by
first filing only a common claim, for the interests of other claim-
ants and creditors have not been prejudiced thereby.27 Nor is
allowance of the general claim by the bank commissioner res
judicata, inasmuch as the commissioner has no judicial power .2
But when such claimant accepts dividends or other benefits as a
common creditor, he is estopped to claim a preference.2 9
The first article of the chapter on the State Department of
Finance in the Revised Statutes is deemed a complete scheme of
liquidation, and other statutes of limitation are inapplicable."
24. Summers v. Farmers' Bank (Mo. App. 1926) 282 S. W. 757; Mann
v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1932) 227 Mo. App. 1, 50 S. W. (2d) 146.
25. Seify v. State Bank (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 205; Winston
Bank v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1932) 227 Mo. App. 77, 51 S. W. (2d)
150.
26. Netherton v. Farmers' Exchange Bank (1933) 228 Mo. App. 296, 63
S. W. (2d) 156. The maker of the note paid it and also a new note which
the bank fraudulently induced to be executed, the maker was held entitled
to a preference on the principle of subrogation. Accord, Noll v. Harrison
County Bank (Mo. App. 1928) 11 S. W. (2d) 77.
27. Macon County v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1930) 325 Mo. 784, 29 S. W.(2d) 1096; In re Liquidation of Gower Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 55 S. W.
(2d) 713.
28. Miller v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1934) 228 Mo. App. 367, 67
S. W. (2d) 528; same (Mo. App. 1937) 107 S. W. (2d) 852.
29. Stoller v. Coates (1885) 88 Mo. 514; Fidelity Nat. Bank & Trust
Co. v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 1090;
Brackenridge v. Moberly (Mo. App. 1937) 102 S. W. (2d) 679.
30. R. S. Mo. (1929) secs. 5282-5343, construed in Commerce Trust Co.
v. Farmers' Exchange Bank (1933) 332 Mo. 979, 61 S. W. (2d) 928, 89
A. L. R. 373. In Ogan v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (Mo. App. 1936)
90 S. W. (2d) 438, plaintiff was a minor at accrual of his cause of action.
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The bank commissioner is required to notify all creditors on the
insolvent bank's books to present proofs of claims within four
months of the notice.3' The word "creditors," as used in the
statute, has been construed to embrace common and preferred
claimants . 2 If the creditor's claim is rejected, he may institute
an action thereon only within the period set by the statute, which
may not be later than six months after the time for allowances
has elapsed.33 If the claim is approved, the creditor seeking
priority must file his preferential claim with the commissioner
for presentation to the circuit court before an order of distribu-
tion is made.34 In such a case, however, the priority seeker is
not required to follow the procedural requirements imposed on
the claimant whose claim has been rejected by the bank com-
missioner5 While the court will give force to equitable consider-
ations to permit filing of a preferred claim after it has been
duly approved as a common claim, 86 an action to obtain reclassi-
fication as preferred claim was held barred where first instituted
over a year after an order of distribution was made 7
Acceptance by a preferred claimant of a note from the bank
does not estop him from pursuing his claim where no creditor
is prejudiced by such acceptance.3 8 Suit by a political subdivi-
sion against an insolvent bank on its depository's bond is not
However the general statute of limitations granting three years after reach-
ing majority was held inapplicable. This case also holds that claims for
preferences are not claims for specific personal property because the money
is not identifiable or separable from the bank's assets.
31. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5333.
32. Commerce Trust Co. v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1933) 332 Mo. 979,
61 S. W. (2d) 928, 89 A. L. R. 373; Power v. Benson Banking Co. (Mo.
App. 1936) 99 S. W. (2d) 109.
33. I. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5337.
34. R. S. Mo. (1929) sec. 5339; Ogan v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank(Mo. App. 1936) 90 S. W. (2d) 438; Power v. Benson Banking Co. (Mo.
App. 1936) 99 S. W. (2d) 1.
35. In re Hodiamont Bank (1936) 230 Mo. App. 190, 91 S. W. (2d) 127;
West End Bank v. University City Bank & Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1936) 97
S. W. (2d) 881. See R. S. Mo. (1929) see. 5339.
36. Macon County v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1930) 325 Mo. 784, 29 S. W.(2d) 1096; Miller v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (Mo. App. 1937) 107 S. W.(2d) 852. In the latter case a suit for preference based on the bank officers'
fraud was held not barred, though brought more than five years after a
common claim was allowed but within five years after the fraud was dis-
covered. Laches was held no bar where no dividends had been declared,
no distribution ordered, and the assets were yet in the hands of the bank
commissioner.
37. Ogan v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (Mo. App. 1936) 90 S. W.(2d) 438.
38. Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchange Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W.(2d) 936, 82 A. L. R. 22; Greenfield v. Clarence Savings Bank (Mo. App.
1928) 5 S. W. (2d) 708; West End Bank v. University City Bank & Trust
Co. (Mo. App. 1936) 97 S. W. (2d) 881.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss2/11
an election of remedies so as to preclude a subsequent suit for
preference in its assets.39 While a depositor may waive his right
to a preference, as by acceptance of a renewal of his certificate
instead of insisting on the cash to which he is entitled,40 proof
that such a renewal is taken by the depositor under a mistaken
belief as to its effect may nevertheless entitle the plaintiff to a
preference. 41
X. TRACING TRUST FUNDS
All authorities unite in holding that in order to impress a trust
on a fund and assert a preferential claim therefor in the hands
of the bank liquidator, the claimant must (1) establish that the
transaction between him and the bank created a trust in his
favor, (2) show that the assets of the bank coming into the
hands of the liquidator were augmented by the fund claimed, and
(3) be able to trace the trust fund into the hands of the bank
commissioner.42
As before indicated in this note, Missouri has been exceedingly
liberal in permitting preferred claimants to follow trust funds
into assets of insolvent banks.4 3 Even in Missouri however the
existence of the trust is not sufficient. It is by indulgence in pre-
sumptions and liberal doctrines that the Missouri courts have
aided the beneficiary to show augmentation and to trace his fund
into the hands of the bank commissioner. 44
True, the bank at the time of going into the commissioner's
hands must have had sufficient assets upon which the trust could
39. Aurora School Dist. v. Bank of Aurora (1932) 227 Mo. App. 339,
52 S. W. (2d) 484.
40. Hennemann v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 113.
41. Niewald v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 464 (re-
covery denied because trust res not traceable).
42. May v. Bank of Hughesville (Mo. App. 1927) 291 S. W. 170; In re
Linn County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 84, 1 S. W. (2d) 206; Evans v.
People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655; Johnson v.
Farmers' Bank (1928) 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090; Porterfield
v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936, 82
A. L. R. 22; Duzan v. Cantley (1932) 227 Mo. App. 670, 55 S. W. (2d)
711. See many cases from nearly all jurisdictions in Braver, Liquidation
of Financial Institutions (1936) 985-990, sec. 854.
The courts are guilty of using the term "trust" very loosely to refer to
all kinds of fiduciary relationships analogous to express trusts. While such
broad use is sometimes objectionable, note (1931) U. of Missouri Bulletin,
50 Law Series 31, as Jessel, M. R., pointed out in Knatchbull v. Hallett
(Eng. 1879) L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 696, it is very proper and convenient in
treating of the doctrine of tracing trust funds inasmuch as there is no
distinction in equity between liabilities of fiduciaries. See Williston, The
Right to Follow Trust Property (1888) 2 Harv. L. Rev. 28.
43. See for general discussion of this subject elaborate Note, (1933) 82
A. L. R. 46.
44. Thomson v. Bank of Syracuse (1926) 220 Mo. App. 805, 278 S. W.
810; Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655.
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be impressed.45 But the assets out of which the trust money may
be reclaimed are not confined to the amount of cash in the bank
vaults alone, which may be less than the amount of the trust
fund.4 6 The claimant is not required either to identify the par-
ticular money claimed,' 7 or to show that the specific funds have
come to the bank commissioner,48 or to trace the fund into any
specific fund or piece of property in the hands of the commis-
sioner.49
The fact that the bank commingles a trust fund with its own
general assets does not preclude the claimant from following his
fund into the assets in the commissioner's hands. 0 Indeed the
45. William R. Compton Co. v. Farmers' Trust Co. (1925) 220 Mo. App.
1081, 279 S. W. 746; Farmers' Trust Co. v. Burnes National Bank (Mo.
App. 1926) 285 S. W. 110; Evans v. People's Bank, supra; Niewald v.
Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 78 S. W. (2d) 464.
46. First Nat. Bank v. Sanford (1895) 62 Mo. App. 394; Nichols v.
Bank of Syracuse (1925) 220 Mo. App. 1019, 278 S. W. 793; Thomson v.
Bank of Syracuse (1926) 220 Me. App. 805, 278 S. W. 810; Federal Re-
serve Bank v. Quigley (Mo. App. 1926) 284 S. W. 164; Johnson v. Farmers'
Bank (1928) 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d) 1090.
47. Harrison v. Smith (1884) 83 Mo. 210, 53 Am. Rep. 571; Schulz v.
Bank of Harrisonville (Mo. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 614; Marshall v. Farm-
ers' & Merchants' Bank (1923) 215 Mo. App. 365, 253 S. W. 15; State
ex rel. Gentry v. Page Bank (1929) 322 Mo. 29, 14 S. W. (2d) 597; Turner
v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 1084; Niewald
v. Rosebud Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 55 S. W. (2d) 464. The majority of the
states follow this modern doctrine, Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 46, 125.
48. Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655;
Special Road Dist. v. Cantley (1928) 223 Mo. App. 89, 8 S. W. (2d) 944;
Security Nat. Bank & Savings Trust Co. v. Moberly (Mo. 1936) 101 S. W.(2d) 33.
49. Harrison v. Smith (1884) 83 Mo. 210, 53 Am. Rep. 571; German
Fire Insurance Co. v. Kimble (1896) 66 Mo. App. 370; Schulz v. Bank of
Harrisonville (Mo. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 614; Federal Reserve Bank v.
Millspaugh (1926) 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706; Evans v. People's Bank,
supra; Johnson v. Farmers' Bank (1928) 223 Mo. App. 513, 11 S. W. (2d)
1090; Huntsville Trust Co. v. Noel (1928) 321 Mo. 749, 12 S. W. (2d) 751;
Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (1929) 323 Mo. 1000, 20 S. W. (2d) 502;
Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d)
936, 82 A. L. R. 22; Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (1932) 329 Mo. 862, 46
S. W. (2d) 874; Harrison Tp. v. People's State Bank (1932) 329 Mo. 968,
46 S. W. (2d) 165; Winston Bank v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1932) 227
Mo. App. 77, 51 S. W. (2d) 150; Commerce Trust Co. v. Farmers' Exchge.
Bank (1933) 332 Mo. 979, 61 S. W. (2d) 928, 89 A. L. R. 373, rvsg. (Mo.
App. 1932) 52 S. W. (2d) 406. A decided majority of jurisdictions are
contra. See Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 46, 71.
50. Harrison v. Smith, supra; Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville, supra;
Marshall v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank (1923) 215 Mo. App. 365, 253
S. W. 15; Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh (1926) 313 Mo. 412, 281
S. W. 733, 47 A. L. R. 754, aff'g (Mo. App. 1925) 275 S. W. 579; Federal
Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, supra; Evans v. People's Bank, supra; Spe-
cial Road Dist. v. Cantley (1928) 223 Mo. App. 89, 8 S. W. (2d) 944;
Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank, supra; Turner v. Farmers' Exchange
Bank (1932) 226 Mo. App. 714, 45 S. W. (2d) 1084; Vandivort v. Sturdi-
vant Bank (Mo. App. 1935) 77 S. W. (2d) 484.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol23/iss2/11
beneficiary in such a case has a charge or lien or preferred de-
mand against the whole mass of the bank's assets by virtue of
the fact that the bank's assets coming into the commissioner's
hands have been augmented and enhanced by the amount of the
trust fund.51 The trust fund may be thus traced into proceeds
from bonds, mortgage notes, bills receivable, real property,
credits or deposits in correspondent banks.52 Thus the bank is
prevented from taking advantage of its own wrong, and the
rights of the general depositors and creditors are not prejudiced
because the fund never belonged to the bank.53
Withdrawals by the bank from such commingled funds are
presumed to be from the bank's portion thereof, so that the trust
fund is not dissipated thereby.- In order to establish dissipation
of the trust fund, the funds must be specifically traced as dissi-
pated, without having augmented the bank's assets, or the funds
with which the trust fund has been commingled must be shown
to have been wholly dissipated and the remaining assets must
have arisen from other sources altogether.55 False and fraudu-
lent entries by the bank on its books, purporting to show dissi-
pation of the trust fund, do not establish such dissipation.5 6 It
is a sufficient tracing if the bank is shown to have a balance in
the common fund equal to the amount of the trust fund.5 7
Missouri is almost alone in holding that there may be an aug-
mentation of the bank's assets coming to the commissioner's
51. See cases in footnote 49.
52. Supra, note 46. An augmentation was even found where a trustee
bank substituted its bad notes in the place of the beneficiary's good notes,
and the beneficiary was entitled to a preference to the extent of the prop-
erty appropriated and thus commingled. Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (1929)
323 Mo. 1000, 20 S. W. (2d) 502; Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank
(1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936, 82 A. L. R. 22.
53. Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655.
However, if after the bank's misappropriation of the trust fund another
bank takes over its assets and assumes its liabilities, the beneficiary can
not claim a preference against the assets of the second bank since the
second bank is not trustee ex maleficio, and its assets are not augmented
by the trust fund. Mann v. Bank of Greenfield (1932) 329 Mo. 862, 46
S. W. (2d) 874.
54. Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse (1925) 220 Mo. App. 1019, 278 S. W.
793. See also West End Bank v. University City Bank & Trust Co. (Mo.
App. 1936) 97 S. W. (2d) 881; Texas Co. v. First Bank & Trust Co. (Mo.
App. 1937) 106 S. W. (2d) 28. This is settled by the overwhelming weight
of authority. Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 46, 141.
55. Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse, supra; Porterfield v. Farmers' Exchge.
Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936, 82 A. L. R. 22.
56. Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse, supra.
57. Special Road Dist. v. Cantley (1928) 223 Mo. App. 89, 8 S. W. (2d)
944. See also Austin v. Haugh (Mo. App. 1928) 10 S. W. (2d) 944, apply-
ing Texas law.
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hands, though the trust fund has been used by the bank to dis-
charge its own liabilities and debts.5 8 Indeed two Missouri cases
do hold that a showing of an application of the special fund to
the bank's obligations rebutted the presumption that the remain-
ing balance was the trust fund and constituted such dissipation
as to preclude the claimant from following the fund to the extent
of the dissipation. 9
However, in Missouri in the very cases declaring the estab-
lished principle imposing on the beneficiary the burden of trac-
ing the trust res, a showing that a trust fund has been com-
mingled with the bank's assets, sufficient of which have come
to the bank commissioner's hands to cover the trust fund, sub-
jects the whole mass of assets to a preferential claim in favor
of the beneficiary.
XI. CONCLUSION
It is not within the scope of this note which covers a broad
field of law to present a critical analysis of the many holdings
of the Missouri courts. It may be seen from the survey of prefer-
ence cases here presented that the Missouri view is uniformly
favorable to the preferred claimant. It is submitted that with
a few noted exceptions the majority of courts differ with Mis-
souri courts not so much in the grounds of granting preference,
i. e. the existence of a trust fund in the claimant's favor, as in
allowing the plaintiff to reclaim the fund from the assets in the
liquidator's hands.60
If this assumption is correct, the position of the Missouri
courts is impregnable. Trust lawyers and others deplore depar-
tures from the fundamental concepts of tracing trust funds with
the necessity of a trust res.6" However such ancestral worship
of fictions must yield to exigencies born of increased complexity
of the commercial banking business. The Bank Collection Code
and other statutes eliminating the need of tracing in collection
58. Schulz v. Bank of Harrisonville (Mo. App. 1923) 246 S. W. 614;
Nichols v. Bank of Syracuse (1925) 220 Mo. App. 1019, 278 S. W. 793;
Evans v. People's Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 990, 6 S. W. (2d) 655; Porter-
field v. Farmers' Exchge. Bank (1931) 327 Mo. 640, 37 S. W. (2d) 936,
82 A. L. R. 22. See contra cases from many jurisdictions in Braver, Liqui-
dation of Financial Institutions (1936) 1027, sec. 876; and Note (1933) 82
A. L. R. 46, 112.
59. In re Linn County Bank (1928) 222 Mo. App. 84, 1 S. W. (2d) 206;
Kline v. Cantley (Mo. App. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 526. See also Cormaney
v. Wells-Hine Trust Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 44 S. W. (2d) 172; Smalley v.
Queen City Bank (Mo. App. 1936) 94 S. W. (2d) 954.
60. See elaborate Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 46, where cases from nearly
all jurisdictions are discussed jointly and severally.
61. Bogert, Failed Banks, Collections Items, and Trust Preferences (1931)
29 Mich. L. Rev. 545, 559.
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and remittance cases are an example of legislative recognition
of the inadequacy of ancient trust doctrines to protect the deposi-
tor.62 Emphasis on the requirement of tracing the trust fund
tends to place a premium on wrongful commingling of trust
funds by the bank so completely that the claimant cannot show
where his fund has gone. To the argument that the general
depositor and creditors rather than the bank are affected by
allowing a preference, may it not be said that it is inequitable
for general creditors to participate in and profit to the extent
of a fund which never belonged to the bank and which therefore
was never a part of the assets against which they claim? The
practicality of such a view is apparent on a comparison of the
benefit that each individual creditor would receive from a pro
rata distribution of the trust fund and the importance to the
beneficiary of being granted a preference.
Certain it is that both statutory law and judicial decisions
everywhere have greatly extended the grounds for granting
preferences in insolvent banks' assets since the dates of the Mis-
souri decisions in Harrison v. Smith63 and Stoller v. Coates,6" of
which the state supreme court later declared: "In going to this
length unquestionably this court took a position in advance of
the English chancery and most of the states of this Union, but
with the soundness of this position we are satisfied."65 Missouri
judicial declarations which continue to flow out of the cases
created by the economic earthquake of 1929 assure the claimant
of the court's continued satisfaction. The courts is too clear,
the current too strong to permit either a reversion to the limited
allowances of common law or a diversion to the strict doctrines
of other jurisdictions.
FRANK R. KENNEDY.
62. Note (1932) 81 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 201.
63. (1884) 82 Mo. 210.
64. (1885) 88 Mo. 514.
65. Midland Nat. Bank v. Brightwell (1899) 148 Mo. 358, 365, 49 S. W.
994.
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